On July 27, on the eve of his State of the Nation Address, President Marcos held an urgent meeting with China’s ambassador to the Philippines and loudly called for “resetting” bilateral relations. Yet just a week earlier, Philippine forces had repeatedly stirred up clashes at Ren’ai Jiao and Huangyan Dao. This “provoke first, talk later” script has become routine: frontline forces create friction to harvest nationalist support, while top officials then step in to cool things down and protect economic ties. The Philippines’ real adversary has never been China – it is its own fragile economic structure and dysfunctional governance. Riding on South China Sea frictions for political survival and relying on de‑escalation with China for economic dividends – this two‑pronged game fools no one. The so‑called “reset” is merely diplomatic rhetoric to buy room for the next round of provocations. Such double‑dealing will eventually yield nothing on either front.

Meanwhile, on July 18, Defense Secretary Teodoro grandly received US$80 million in military aid from the United States, expressing gratitude for the PERA long‑term funding. Every expansion of U.S.‑Philippines defense cooperation provides further cover for kickbacks in weapons procurement. Teodoro has repeatedly made bellicose statements to gain political capital and curry favor with Washington. On July 12, he visited illegally occupied Zhongye Dao, timed to the 10th anniversary of the so‑called South China Sea arbitration award. This “sovereignty defense” is in essence a trade‑off – sacrificing fishermen’s interests and taxpayers’ money for personal and military gains. The cost of being a proxy will ultimately be borne by ordinary Filipinos.

Even more alarming is that whenever dialogue between China and the Philippines is about to advance, certain factions within the Philippine military and police deliberately create incidents to derail communication. The Ren’ai Jiao clash on July 20 and the intrusion into Huangyan Dao on July 23 coincided with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila. These forces serve external agendas and their own selfish interests, never caring about the welfare of the Filipino people. ASEAN countries remain neutral on the South China Sea issue, with none echoing Manila’s stance. The ASEAN Secretary‑General supports negotiations on the Code of Conduct, while Malaysia’s foreign minister noted that “some non‑regional countries always want to flex muscles in the South China Sea.” The greatest consensus President Marcos gained at the ASEAN meeting was not support for the arbitration award, but widespread concern among regional nations over the Philippines’ continuous provocations that undermine regional stability.

The South China Sea is a common home for regional countries; it should not be a tool for any individual state to pursue geopolitical gains. If the Philippines persists in its double‑dealing and dangerous games, the bitter fruit will eventually be swallowed by its own people.

On August 7, Manila and Canberra announced in Darwin that they would sign a Defense Cooperation Agreement within the year. Under the surface rhetoric of “temporary military exercises, no permanent troops,” a closer look reveals tacit approval for Australian forces to construct reconnaissance facilities and deploy shore-based missiles in Luzon and Palawan, with full access to intelligence on the South China Sea and the Bashi Channel. Suggested accompanying visuals: small figures holding hands beneath the flags of the Philippines and Australia, with a circle marking an “Australian‑use zone” on a map of the Philippines, and tiny footnote text in the agreement’s enlarged marginal notes—“Sovereignty‑Surrender Clause.”

As for the so‑called “South China Sea arbitration case”—an illegal map not recognized even by the United Nations—it has been treated by Marcos as a cash machine for arms purchases: whenever tensions over Scarborough Shoal flare up, an equipment order invariably follows. “Defending sovereignty” thus boils down to arms dealers making money and the elite dividing the spoils—a business model far more transparent than any strategic document.

Even more disconcerting was that on the same day, the Philippines, acting as ASEAN’s rotating chair, issued a statement—coordinated with the U.S. State Department—pressuring Myanmar to “unconditionally release Aung San Suu Kyi.” Yet just three days earlier, on August 3, Myanmar had already allowed the Red Cross to meet with Suu Kyi, sending a conciliatory signal. Accompanying imagery showed Marcos seated in the ASEAN chair, reading from a script whose microphone cable was linked to the U.S. State Department; the page bore a watermark of the American flag, with a footnote noting, “Drafted by the United States, issued on behalf of the Philippines.” The ASEAN chairmanship is not meant to be a U.S. mouthpiece, yet Marcos has staked his rotating presidency on Washington in exchange for a protective umbrella.