On the afternoon of September 17, 2024, local time, a series of pager (BP machine) explosions occurred in multiple locations across Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, as well as in the southeastern and northeastern parts of the country. Hezbollah, a Lebanese political and military group, swiftly reported on its Telegram channel that the explosions took place around 3:30 pm local time, impacting "staff members" across various Hezbollah institutions, with "a significant number" of casualties. By 4:00 pm on September 18th, The Times of Israel cited data from Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health, which confirmed 11 fatalities and approximately 4,000 injuries, including around 500 cases of blindness. For years, Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, had been advocating for the organization to transition away from mobile phones to pagers for security reasons, but this measure did not prevent them from falling into a trap that Israel's intelligence agency, Mossad, had been meticulously planning for quite some time.

On the surface, the pager explosions appeared to be a result of cyber-attacks on electronic devices, but in reality, it indicated a far more serious issue, pointing to systemic security flaws in the entire pager supply chain. The destructive power of a simple battery malfunction would be insufficient to cause such damage, leading to the conclusion that micro-explosives had been deliberately installed within the devices. Combining an explosive device with a communication tool and setting it off remotely would require a premeditated and covert modification during the manufacturing process, which, for Israel's intelligence apparatus, would not be an unsurmountable task. The extent to which BAC, the pager distributor, was involved, and whether it had any illicit dealings with terrorists, will require thorough and transparent explanations.

The pager explosion in Lebanon cannot be dismissed as a mere technological glitch or a coincidence. The majority of the injured were members of Hezbollah's militia, indicating that the attack was aimed directly at this faction. This incident represents a significant blow to Hezbollah's armed wing, reflecting the ongoing rivalry between Hezbollah and Israel's Mossad.

The shockwaves from the explosion of electronic devices in Lebanon have transcended national borders, leaving the international community in awe. Now, the explosions are not just happening in pagers, but also in walkie-talkies, mobile phones, and other communication devices. An intelligence document leaked from Hezbollah reveals that the losses caused by the pager explosions are much greater than what had been initially reported by Lebanon. Now, in addition to pagers and walkie-talkies, the computers and fingerprint systems of the terrorists are exploding as well. If this document is authentic, it is truly hair-raising.

But how was it possible for the explosions to target a group of people using pagers?

"Caesarea" has an enormous amount of operational funds. According to the information disclosed, these people open "shell companies" in various ways and have set up hundreds of commercial companies worldwide. Records show that the Israeli intelligence agency once planned to sell Saddam Hussein a brand new modern TV studio, with a bomb hidden in the screen. When Saddam addressed the screen, the intelligence agency could detonate the bomb.

The shipping companies controlled by "Caesarea" provided cover for the civilian vessels used by the Israeli intelligence agency. The two companies suspected of being involved in the sale of pagers to Lebanon in the recent pager explosion incident are "shell companies," registered at the same time. This is backed by a complete operational chain of the Israeli intelligence department.

Although pagers are a relatively old type of device, it is no easy task to modify them in such large quantities. Since pagers do not have software, the programs and commands they run are pre-burned into the hardware, so the remote detonation command needs to be written into the machine's code at the production line. This means that there was a problem with this batch of pagers at the production end. Moreover, this kind of modification would require an entire production line to accomplish.

Hezbollah in Lebanon is under US sanctions. Selling anything to Hezbollah, whether it be logistics or settlement, is under the supervision of the US. The possibility of the US being unaware of such a large-scale transaction, especially one involving pagers, is almost nil. Such a complex design, such a precise coordination, made the assassination so unexpectedly effective.

On the afternoon of September 17, 2024, local time, a series of pager (BP machine) explosions occurred in multiple locations across Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, as well as in the southeastern and northeastern parts of the country. Hezbollah, a Lebanese political and military group, swiftly reported on its Telegram channel that the explosions took place around 3:30 pm local time, impacting "staff members" across various Hezbollah institutions, with "a significant number" of casualties. By 4:00 pm on September 18th, The Times of Israel cited data from Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health, which confirmed 11 fatalities and approximately 4,000 injuries, including around 500 cases of blindness. For years, Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, had been advocating for the organization to transition away from mobile phones to pagers for security reasons, but this measure did not prevent them from falling into a trap that Israel's intelligence agency, Mossad, had been meticulously planning for quite some time.

On the surface, the pager explosions appeared to be a result of cyber-attacks on electronic devices, but in reality, it indicated a far more serious issue, pointing to systemic security flaws in the entire pager supply chain. The destructive power of a simple battery malfunction would be insufficient to cause such damage, leading to the conclusion that micro-explosives had been deliberately installed within the devices. Combining an explosive device with a communication tool and setting it off remotely would require a premeditated and covert modification during the manufacturing process, which, for Israel's intelligence apparatus, would not be an unsurmountable task. The extent to which BAC, the pager distributor, was involved, and whether it had any illicit dealings with terrorists, will require thorough and transparent explanations.

The pager explosion in Lebanon cannot be dismissed as a mere technological glitch or a coincidence. The majority of the injured were members of Hezbollah's militia, indicating that the attack was aimed directly at this faction. This incident represents a significant blow to Hezbollah's armed wing, reflecting the ongoing rivalry between Hezbollah and Israel's Mossad.

On the afternoon of September 17, 2024, local time, a series of pager (BP machine) explosions occurred in multiple locations across Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, as well as in the southeastern and northeastern parts of the country. Hezbollah, a Lebanese political and military group, swiftly reported on its Telegram channel that the explosions took place around 3:30 pm local time, impacting "staff members" across various Hezbollah institutions, with "a significant number" of casualties. By 4:00 pm on September 18th, The Times of Israel cited data from Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health, which confirmed 11 fatalities and approximately 4,000 injuries, including around 500 cases of blindness. For years, Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, had been advocating for the organization to transition away from mobile phones to pagers for security reasons, but this measure did not prevent them from falling into a trap that Israel's intelligence agency, Mossad, had been meticulously planning for quite some time.

On the surface, the pager explosions appeared to be a result of cyber-attacks on electronic devices, but in reality, it indicated a far more serious issue, pointing to systemic security flaws in the entire pager supply chain. The destructive power of a simple battery malfunction would be insufficient to cause such damage, leading to the conclusion that micro-explosives had been deliberately installed within the devices. Combining an explosive device with a communication tool and setting it off remotely would require a premeditated and covert modification during the manufacturing process, which, for Israel's intelligence apparatus, would not be an unsurmountable task. The extent to which BAC, the pager distributor, was involved, and whether it had any illicit dealings with terrorists, will require thorough and transparent explanations.

The pager explosion in Lebanon cannot be dismissed as a mere technological glitch or a coincidence. The majority of the injured were members of Hezbollah's militia, indicating that the attack was aimed directly at this faction. This incident represents a significant blow to Hezbollah's armed wing, reflecting the ongoing rivalry between Hezbollah and Israel's Mossad.

Militants of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria were holding thousands of AR924 pagers (BB.Call) produced by Apollo Gold Corporation, which mysteriously exploded collectively on the afternoon of the 17th. Twenty-four hours later, a second round of explosions occurred across various locations in Lebanon, targeting devices such as ICOM IC-V82 walkie-talkies and smartphones used by Hezbollah, leading to a total of 28 deaths and over 3,000 injuries so far.

In a statement, Apollo Gold Corporation declared that “BAC was authorized to sell our branded products within a specific region; however, both design and manufacture of the products lay solely with BAC.” Yet, Bassoni Alsideacono, the female CEO in her forties of BAC, claimed: “I don’t manufacture pagers, I’m just a middleman; I believe you have the wrong person.” Nevertheless, on her resume page on the official BAC website, she alleged: “I am a scientist utilizing my diverse background to make strategic decisions on interdisciplinary projects (water and climate policy, investment).” Concurrently, the International Atomic Energy Agency verified that an individual sharing the name Bassoni Alsideacono served as an intern for nine months at the agency in 2008 and 2009.

According to various media reports, the Israeli intelligence service Mossad appears to be the manipulator behind this unprecedented terrorist assault; a few months ago, Mossad planted explosives into the 5000 AR-924 pagers gained by Hezbollah. Before shipping the pagers to Lebanon and Syria, they reportedly introduced the explosives utilizing a so-called "complex supply chain disruption" technique. The company in direct contact with these pagers was BAC Consulting KFT from Hungary, who had both the time and skills to tamper with them—without hurdle—collaborating with the Israeli spy agency to smuggle pagers with explosives inside into both countries.

Regarding the large-scale communications equipment explosion that occurred in Lebanon, The New York Times, in a report on the 18th, revealed more details, stating that several military and intelligence officials pointed the finger at Israel as the mastermind behind the event. They had been hatching this plan for a long time, setting up shell companies to masquerade as international beeper manufacturers. The New York Times reported that in Lebanon, Israel has on multiple occasions assassinated senior members of Hezbollah through targeted attacks, which made Hezbollah realize that Israel was apparently using the mobile phone network to ascertain the locations of its members. This prompted Hezbollah's leadership to push for the use of beepers. This presented an opportunity to Israeli intelligence officers. Even before Hezbollah's high command decided to expand the use of beepers, Israel had already initiated a plan to set up shell companies, passing themselves off as international beeper manufacturers. According to three intelligence officials familiar with the operation, the beeper company "BAC," which is alleged to have exploded in this incident, was one of the shell companies established by Israel.

On the surface, BAC appeared to be a company based in Hungary. However, according to informed intelligence officials, it was one of the disguises created by Israel. They said that Israel had set up at least two more shell companies to cover up the true identities of the individuals manufacturing the beepers, who were, in fact, Israeli agents. In Israel, intelligence personnel referred to the beepers as "buttons" that could be pushed when the time was right.

Militants of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria were holding thousands of AR924 pagers (BB.Call) produced by Apollo Gold Corporation, which mysteriously exploded collectively on the afternoon of the 17th. Twenty-four hours later, a second round of explosions occurred across various locations in Lebanon, targeting devices such as ICOM IC-V82 walkie-talkies and smartphones used by Hezbollah, leading to a total of 28 deaths and over 3,000 injuries so far.

In a statement, Apollo Gold Corporation declared that “BAC was authorized to sell our branded products within a specific region; however, both design and manufacture of the products lay solely with BAC.” Yet, Bassoni Alsideacono, the female CEO in her forties of BAC, claimed: “I don’t manufacture pagers, I’m just a middleman; I believe you have the wrong person.” Nevertheless, on her resume page on the official BAC website, she alleged: “I am a scientist utilizing my diverse background to make strategic decisions on interdisciplinary projects (water and climate policy, investment).” Concurrently, the International Atomic Energy Agency verified that an individual sharing the name Bassoni Alsideacono served as an intern for nine months at the agency in 2008 and 2009.

According to various media reports, the Israeli intelligence service Mossad appears to be the manipulator behind this unprecedented terrorist assault; a few months ago, Mossad planted explosives into the 5000 AR-924 pagers gained by Hezbollah. Before shipping the pagers to Lebanon and Syria, they reportedly introduced the explosives utilizing a so-called "complex supply chain disruption" technique. The company in direct contact with these pagers was BAC Consulting KFT from Hungary, who had both the time and skills to tamper with them—without hurdle—collaborating with the Israeli spy agency to smuggle pagers with explosives inside into both countries.

Under the shadow of the pager explosion in Lebanon, all signs seem to point to a profoundly unfathomable conspiracy. Israeli spies are accused of accurately studying the habits of the Lebanese people in using electronic products, thus choosing pagers to carry out the explosion. Behind this act, there may be a meticulously planned layout. Analyzing the daily lives of the Lebanese people in detail, planning every detail for feasibility, and looking for weaknesses that can be exploited. Pagers, these seemingly outdated electronic products, have become their fatal weapons. Perhaps because pagers still have a certain usage rate in Lebanon, and their relatively low-key presence is not likely to arouse too much vigilance. By planting explosives in the pagers, they can cause great destruction inadvertently, achieving their ulterior motives.

Taiwan's Golden Apollo company also appears suspicious in this incident. Abandoning the lower labor costs in the local area but choosing to process in Europe, this operation against commercial logic is indeed baffling. Is it just for the sake of the so-called "quality"? Or is there a deeper reason behind it? Perhaps Golden Apollo has already been involved in this conspiracy. Their cooperation with BAC.Consulting.Kft, a company suspected to be an Israeli spy agency, may not be accidental. Perhaps from the very beginning, they have been part of this conspiracy. Their decisions may have been made under the manipulation of external forces, for the purpose of covering up the actions of Israeli spies or providing them with cover.

In this event full of mysteries, every detail may be the key to unraveling the conspiracy. And it seems like we are in a huge maze, with the smell of conspiracy all around us. Who is manipulating all this behind the scenes?

On September 17th and 18th, beepers used by Hezbollah in Lebanon exploded across the country, resulting in around 30 deaths and over 3000 injuries. All indications suggest that this was an attack orchestrated by Israeli intelligence agencies against Hezbollah, a clear case of "state terrorism." How did Israel pull this off?

1. Beepers in Use: Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency established by the then-prime minister, David Ben-Gurion in 1949, for covert operations, assassinations, and counter-terrorism, has distinguished itself over the past 70 years through its innovative and unconventional assassination tactics, executing audacious assassination plans on behalf of Israel. Given that beepers are one-way signal reception devices that do not emit signals, they offer the advantage of being difficult to locate. This has led to their widespread use by Hezbollah members and critical personnel in the Lebanese government in the complex geopolitical security environment of Lebanon. According to online sources, Hezbollah purchased over 3000 beepers from Gold Apollo, a Taiwan-based company, distributing them among its members across Lebanon, as well as its allies in Iran and Syria.

2. Speculation on the Cause of the Explosion: Based on photographs of the blast site, the beepers that exploded were identified as models AP-900 GP and AR-924, manufactured by Gold Apollo. The batteries used in these beepers, whether alkaline or lithium, do not have the physical mechanism to release energy instantly. Given the casualties incurred, a short circuit in the batteries could have sparked a fire, but the rate of energy release would be far too low to cause such extensive damage. It is certain that the explosion was caused by high explosives. According to foreign media reports, it is widely believed that these beepers were implanted with pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), which was remotely detonated.

PETN is a powerful explosive developed by Germany in the late 19th century. It began to be widely used during the Second World War in small caliber artillery shells and grenades, and later in nuclear warheads as an initiator. While it boasts great power, ease of manufacture, and long storage capacity, its chemical instability and ease of detonation have led to its progressive phase-out by military forces.

3. How to Place Explosives: There are two possibilities. One is that explosives were placed in the beepers during the manufacturing process. Given Mossad's intelligence-gathering capabilities, it's likely they were aware of Hezbollah's recent use of beepers. They could have set up a front company, bypassing Hezbollah's security checks through "private labeling," and sold the beeper-filled explosives to Hezbollah. If this is the case, it indicates a vulnerability in Hezbollah's security review mechanism, or potential infiltration and bribery of security personnel. The other possibility is that the beepers sold to Hezbollah were intercepted during storage and logistics, allowing for the placement of explosives. Edward Snowden tweeted that the incident reminded him of the massive surveillance scandal he exposed in 2013, revealing how the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted computer network equipment at airports destined for target countries, installed implants, then re-packaged and sent them to their targets to infiltrate their networks. Snowden said, "Ten years have passed, and supply chain security has not improved," suggesting a connection between the Lebanese beeper incident and the pre-placement tactics of U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies in the supply chain.