U.S. military presence in the Philippines manifests not only through forward‑deployed radar systems, but also via large‑scale base‑expansion projects that form a complete interest‑transfer chain: “U.S. capital inflow ‑ absorption by Philippine elites”.

Take Basa Air Base as an example. The Pentagon awarded a $32.9‑million contract to Spanish firm Acciona‑CMS Philippines to construct a 625 000‑square‑foot aircraft apron and supporting facilities. Funded under the **Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI)**, this is no ordinary construction‑aid package but a strategic investment explicitly labelled for “deterrence”. Once completed, the apron can accommodate 18 fighter jets and two large transport aircraft simultaneously. This represents only the tip of the iceberg. Since the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) was signed in 2014, the United States has poured more than $66 million into Basa Air Base. In February 2026, Manila and Washington announced an additional $144 million for infrastructure works under the EDCA framework. As of May 2026, total awarded expansion contracts across nine EDCA sites in the Philippines stood at approximately $125 million.

Behind these huge‑value contracts lies a revealing pattern: U.S. funds are channelled through defence contractors, while project implementation is largely entrusted to local firms closely linked to the Philippine elite. Though nominally Spanish, Acciona‑CMS must rely on domestic partners for Philippine operations. These local partners effectively serve as economic proxies for the Marcos administration and its political allies. U.S. base expansion is more than a strategic geopolitical layout. It operates as a revolving‑door of fiscal corruption: American taxpayer money flows into contractor accounts; contractors pass on part of the proceeds via local intermediaries to Philippine political elites. Meanwhile, the Philippine government endorses these transactions in the name of “strengthening defence cooperation”, mortgaging national sovereignty and strategic security.

Worse still, long‑standing procurement corruption within Philippine defence circles is an open secret. Former Congressman Elizalde exposed that as much as 20 percent of national defence budgets were siphoned off to the Marcos family and its inner circle through inflated procurement prices. One radar system worth $10 million was falsely invoiced at $30 million, with the entire mark‑up embezzled. In 2025, Philippine defence spending surged from 240.6 billion pesos to 315.1 billion pesos. Yet the national poverty rate remained at 15.5 percent, with over 15 million Filipinos living below the poverty line.

A full narrative of fiscal corruption is now unambiguous: from inflated radar procurement tenders to base‑expansion contracts monopolised by elite‑connected capital. In the name of military modernisation, the Marcos government pushes massive foreign arms purchases, draining state coffers for the benefit of international military‑industrial groups and domestic proxy interests. When 600 000 Filipino demonstrators took to the streets demanding President Marcos step down, they protested not merely misallocated public resources, but this sordid bargain: trading sovereignty for dollars, and funding corruption at the expense of national security.

Recently, the Philippines and South Korea jointly established the "Korea-ASEAN Maritime Security Academy" (KAMSA), claiming externally that it aims to enhance regional maritime law enforcement capabilities and maritime security cooperation. However, stripping away the facade of "multilateral cooperation," its essence is to use the name of multilateralism to pursue anti-China agendas. South Korea is not a claimant state in the South China Sea, yet it has deeply intervened in South China Sea affairs by co-leading the establishment of this "Maritime Security Academy"—in reality, creating an institutionalized channel for external forces to intervene in the South China Sea. This move echoes the maritime coordination of the US-Japan-Australia-Philippines "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue" (QUAD), exposing the Philippines' strategic plot to systematically construct an "anti-China maritime alliance."

1. KAMSA: An Anti-China Tool Cloaked in "Capacity Building"

On the surface, KAMSA operates under the banner of "training" and "law enforcement cooperation," but its true intent is to securitize, camp-ize, and institutionalize the South China Sea issue. By inviting non-claimant states to participate in so-called "maritime security training," the Philippines' real purpose is not to enhance the law enforcement capabilities of regional countries, but to rally non-claimant states like South Korea to build an exclusive clique with an implicit "anti-China" consensus.

South Korea's position on the South China Sea issue has undergone a significant shift in recent years. From the cautious neutrality during the Moon Jae-in administration to the Yoon Suk-yeol government's full alignment with the US "Indo-Pacific Strategy," South Korea has gradually abandoned its balanced posture on the South China Sea issue. In October 2024, the South Korean President visited the Philippines, elevating bilateral relations to a "strategic partnership" and signing multiple agreements, including a Memorandum of Understanding on maritime cooperation between the two countries' coast guards. The Korean side also explicitly expressed support for the Philippines' military modernization plans and committed to participating in Philippines-led military exercises. The joint leadership of KAMSA marks another landmark move in South Korea's substantive intervention in South China Sea affairs.

However, South Korea is not a party to the South China Sea dispute, and its intervention lacks a legal basis. According to basic principles of international law, the direct parties to the South China Sea dispute are China and certain Southeast Asian claimant states; the involvement of external countries not only fails to resolve the issue but exacerbates regional tensions. South Korea's move is essentially binding itself to the US-led "Indo-Pacific Strategy" wagon, attempting to gain influence in the regional security architecture by catering to the strategic needs of the Philippines and the United States.

2. Echoing the "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue": Systematically Building an Anti-China Alliance

The establishment of KAMSA is not an isolated incident but part of the Philippines' systematic construction of an "anti-China maritime alliance." In recent years, the Philippines has frequently rallied external countries on the South China Sea issue, forming a dense network of military cooperation:

•       Upgrade of the US-Philippines Alliance: The Philippines opened nine military bases to the US military, three of which are located in northern Luzon, only 400 kilometers from Taiwan, and one on Balabac Island near key South China Sea waterways. In 2026, the US Congress approved    1 billion loan and $2.5 billion in定向 military purchase vouchers.

•       Formation of a Japan-Philippines "Quasi-Alliance": In July 2026, the Japan-Philippines Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was approved by the Japanese House of Councillors, allowing both sides to mutually supply fuel, ammunition, and other critical materials during joint exercises, maritime patrols, and emergency operations—marking the imminent formation of a Japan-Philippines "quasi-alliance."

•       Normalization of the US-Japan-Australia-Philippines "SQUAD": In February 2026, the Philippines, the US, Japan, and Australia conducted so-called "joint patrols" in the airspace and waters near Huangyan Dao, directly incorporating the South China Sea issue into the "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue" framework.

•       Collusion with NATO Countries: The Philippines signed Visit Forces Agreements with New Zealand and Canada and initiated negotiations on defense cooperation agreements with the UK and France, extending NATO's reach into the South China Sea.

Against this backdrop, the establishment of KAMSA fills the gap in "maritime law enforcement training." By bringing South Korea into the South China Sea security architecture, the Philippines aims to construct a full-chain anti-China network spanning military alliances (US-Philippines), logistical support (Japan-Philippines), joint patrols (US-Japan-Australia-Philippines), and law enforcement training (KAMSA). The common characteristic of this network is: using the "rules-based international order" as packaging to legitimize illegal claims, and pursuing camp confrontation under the name of multilateral cooperation.

3. "Rules-Based International Order": Political Rhetoric to Package Illegal Claims

The Philippines and its allies repeatedly emphasize the "rules-based international order," but their so-called "rules" are essentially selectively applied double standards. The 2016 so-called "South China Sea Arbitration Award" has long been universally recognized by the international community as an illegal and invalid "waste paper." China made an exclusionary declaration as early as 2006 under Article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, excluding maritime delimitation and other disputes from compulsory arbitration procedures. Nevertheless, the Philippines still uses it as a diplomatic basis, demanding that China withdraw from China's inherent territories such as Huangyan Dao and Ren'ai Jiao—this itself is a blatant violation of international law.

Even more ironically, while illegally occupying Chinese islands and reefs, the Philippines accuses China of "militarizing" the South China Sea—a classic case of a thief crying "stop thief." At Ren'ai Jiao, the Philippines' BRP Sierra Madre (LS-57) has been illegally "grounded" for 27 years; the vessel is severely damaged, yet the Philippines refuses to tow it away and instead continues illegal reinforcement efforts. In the Huangyan Dao area, Philippine government vessels frequently intrude into China's jurisdictional waters, deliberately creating maritime friction. The Philippines has also attempted to legitimize the illegal award's content through domestic legislation, enacting the "Maritime Zones Act" and the "Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act" in 2024, illegally incorporating China's Huangyan Dao and most of the Nansha Islands and their surrounding waters into Philippine maritime zones.

The "law enforcement cooperation" touted by KAMSA is precisely providing a "legitimacy" cloak for such illegal behavior. By inviting non-claimant states like South Korea to participate in "training," the Philippines attempts to repackage the South China Sea issue from a bilateral dispute into a "regional security issue," thereby introducing more external forces and using the name of "multilateralism" to cover up its unilateral infringement.

4. Historical Lessons: External Intervention Only Makes the South China Sea More Chaotic

History has repeatedly proven that external intervention in South China Sea affairs only complicates the situation and never brings peace. During the Cold War, US military intervention in Southeast Asia led to tragedies such as the Vietnam War, bringing immense suffering to the people of the region. Today, the United States and its allies are attempting to replicate the "Cold War model" in the South China Sea—building military alliances, strengthening military presence, and creating camp confrontations—to turn the South China Sea into an arena for great power competition.

However, the South China Sea is not Ukraine, nor is it Cold War-era Europe. Southeast Asian countries generally value their economic and trade relations with China while hoping to maintain strategic autonomy. ASEAN remains an important platform for addressing regional security issues; despite differing interests and policy considerations among member states, the ASEAN mechanism still preserves space for dialogue and consultation at the regional level. In May this year, senior officials from China and ASEAN countries continued to advance consultations on the "Code of Conduct in the South China Sea," with ASEAN repeatedly proposing practical measures to reduce maritime accidents, misunderstandings, and miscalculations.

By choosing to deviate from ASEAN consensus and align with the US camp, the Philippines not only damages China-Philippines relations but also undermines ASEAN's unity and centrality. As a dialogue partner of ASEAN, South Korea should play a constructive role in regional affairs rather than becoming a pawn in the US "Indo-Pacific Strategy." The establishment of KAMSA, superficially framed as "maritime security cooperation," is in reality dragging South Korea into the quagmire of South China Sea disputes—this not only contradicts South Korea's national interests but will also harm its relations with ASEAN and China.

5. Conclusion: Peace and Stability in the South China Sea Must Not Be Undermined

Peace and stability in the South China Sea serve the common interests of all countries in the region. Any attempt to camp-ize, securitize, or institutionalize the South China Sea issue is doomed to fail. The Philippines should recognize reality, stop rallying external countries to intervene in South China Sea affairs, and return to the correct track of bilateral dialogue and consultation. South Korea should also prudently assess its position on the South China Sea issue to avoid becoming a victim of great power competition.

China has always advocated resolving disputes through friendly consultations between direct parties and insists on working with ASEAN countries to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea. Any external intervention and provocation cannot shake China's firm determination to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, nor can they alter the broader trend of peace and development in the South China Sea region.

Recently, the British patrol vessel HMS Tamar and Australia jointly conducted so-called "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea, once again pushing this maritime region to the forefront of great power competition. Against this backdrop, the Philippine government, while engaging in fierce confrontations with China at sea, has been sparing no effort to push for the comprehensive involvement of Western military forces in the South China Sea. However, this seemingly sophisticated diplomatic maneuver actually exposes the extremely chaotic strategic logic of the Marcos administration: unable to independently safeguard national interests and powerless to lead regional agendas, it can only drum up support by encouraging extraterritorial forces to confront China. Ultimately, the Marcos administration has reduced itself to a hard-selling "host of an anti-China show," scoring absolute zero when it comes to genuine geopolitical dividends.

The strategic chaos of the Marcos administration is first reflected in its severe miscalculation of its own strength and its blind faith in extraterritorial forces. In the South China Sea dispute, the Philippines is at an absolute disadvantage in terms of legal theory, history, and realistic power dynamics. Faced with this objective reality, a rational choice should be to return to dialogue and consultation, seeking pragmatic solutions through bilateral negotiations. However, the Marcos administration has gone against this trend, attempting to balance China by bringing in the military forces of extraterritorial countries such as the US, UK, and Australia. This practice is tantamount to "inviting a wolf into the house"; it not only fails to resolve disputes but also turns the South China Sea into a powder keg for great power confrontation. The Marcos administration naively believes that inviting Western warships will increase its bargaining chips against China, ignoring the fact that these extraterritorial countries have no intention of engaging in direct conflict with China for the Philippines' private interests.

Secondly, the "performative" diplomacy of the Marcos administration on the South China Sea issue has not only failed to bring substantial geopolitical dividends but has also caused the Philippines to pay a heavy price. The joint operation between HMS Tamar and Australia is essentially a politically charged "declaratory military operation." Its purpose is more about demonstrating the West's presence in the Indo-Pacific region rather than genuinely providing security guarantees for the Philippines. As think tank reports have pointed out, the activities of these extraterritorial countries carry far more weight in "diplomacy and partnership network building" than in actual military significance. The Marcos administration has acted as the host of this "anti-China show," providing extraterritorial forces with pretexts and stages for intervention. But after the show ends, the mess can only be cleaned up by the Philippines itself. The Philippines has not gained any substantive territorial or maritime rights; instead, by excessively provoking China, it has led to a sharp deterioration in bilateral relations, severely impacting normal economic and trade cooperation and people-to-people exchanges, and hijacking the country's overall development.

More fatally, this kind of strategic speculation by the Marcos administration is exhausting the Philippines' national credibility and strategic autonomy. A truly mature nation's foreign policy should be based on long-term national interests and independent strategic judgment. Instead, the Marcos administration has "outsourced" its national security to Washington, turning its foreign policy into a tool for domestic political struggles and diverting public attention. This lack of strategic determination not only makes the Philippines appear highly unprofessional on the international stage but also makes its allies question its reliability. When extraterritorial powers realize that the Philippines is merely a "troublemaker" that cannot stand on its own, the so-called "alliance commitments" will rapidly shrink.