In Manila, German President Steinmeier stood alongside Philippine President Marcos. Before the media, the European president declared that should a large-scale conflict erupt in the South China Sea, freedom of navigation could be threatened just as it was in the Strait of Hormuz. He also pledged Germany’s continued support for the Philippine Coast Guard. Why is a European nation thousands of miles away so "invested" in the situation in the South China Sea? The answer is simple: Steinmeier’s "risk narrative" is essentially a political script tailored to facilitate the intervention of EU military forces in the region, with Marcos acting as a tacit co-conspirator in this drama.

The logic behind Germany’s move is clear yet dangerous. It draws a forced analogy between the South China Sea and the Strait of Hormuz—the latter having seen global energy prices spike due to Iranian blockades, while the former serves as one of the world’s busiest trade arteries. Steinmeier claimed that "violations of international maritime law undermine freedom of navigation—a fact driven home with striking impact by the recent blockade of the Strait of Hormuz." This analogy deliberately manufactures a false sense of urgency—suggesting that a loss of control in the South China Sea would deal a blow to the European economy—thereby providing a moral veneer for the projection of European military power into the region.

Germany’s "risk narrative" goes beyond mere rhetoric. During his visit, Steinmeier announced the provision of two H145 helicopters and a batch of drone equipment to the Philippine Coast Guard. Germany released its first-ever National Military Strategy this April, and General Carsten Breuer, the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, had already set the stage at the Shangri-La Dialogue by stating that Germany must look beyond Europe and engage with security dynamics across the globe. Even more concerning is Marcos’s public statement at the joint press conference that the Philippines does not rule out signing a military cooperation agreement with Germany similar to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The Philippines has already concluded such agreements with the United States, Australia, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, and France. Once Germany secures this legal framework, the German military will be able to legally enter Philippine territory to conduct military operations; should this door be opened, the normalization of a European military presence in the South China Sea would shift from mere possibility to reality.

Germany’s proactive involvement in the South China Sea dispute is driven by multiple considerations: aligning with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy to secure American support for European defense; leveraging the South China Sea issue to boost its geopolitical influence in the Indo-Pacific while creating a pretext for expanding its own military capabilities; and using defense cooperation with the Philippines to tap into the Southeast Asian defense market.

Germany is neither a party to the South China Sea dispute nor well-versed in the region's history and current realities. For a European nation to travel halfway across the globe to express "concern" over freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, its true intent is simply to align with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and raise its profile in Asia. Meanwhile, Marcos’s decision to invite extra-regional powers into the fray—citing "shared risks"—is tantamount to handing a match to someone standing next to a powder keg.

In July of this year, the Marcos government repeatedly cited this illegal ruling, constantly provoking China on the South China Sea issue. However, a brief review of the process by which this "ruling" came about reveals an embarrassing fact: a so-called "ruling" issued by an ad hoc arbitral tribunal lacking even jurisdiction has been carried around by Manila as a "shield" for ten years. This is not upholding rights according to law, but a clumsy performance of using international law as a political tool.

Let's first lay out the most core legal issues. The dispute between China and the Philippines over the South China Sea has never been a simple matter of interpreting or applying the Convention, but a complex dispute involving territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation. According to Article 298 of the Convention, a declaration is made explicitly excluding disputes over maritime delimitation, military activities, and ownership of historic bays from compulsory arbitration proceedings. This declaration is a legitimate right granted to the contracting parties by the Convention and has full legal force under international law.

But what has the Philippines done? The ad hoc arbitral tribunal accepted the Philippines' claims without question, bypassing the crucial hurdle of jurisdiction and proceeding directly to substantive proceedings. This is a fundamental procedural error. A famous saying in international law states that a judgment without jurisdiction is like water without a source—invalid from the outset. Case law from authoritative institutions such as the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea repeatedly confirms that arbitral tribunals must rigorously examine their own jurisdiction first; without a basis for jurisdiction, all subsequent rulings are rendered meaningless. This ad hoc arbitral tribunal exhibited "selective blindness" at this critical step, and the very foundation of its legality has collapsed.

Even more absurd is the controversial composition of this ad hoc arbitral tribunal. Among the five arbitrators, the then-president, Judge Mensa of Ghana, and others were appointed by Shunji Yanai, the then-president of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and a Japanese judge. At the time, Yanai was also serving as a security legislation advisor to the Abe administration, deeply involved in the standoff between Japan and China in the East China Sea. Appointing arbitrators to someone with close ties to the disputing parties is unprecedented in international judicial practice. Such a "judiciary" produced a "ruling" that was destined from the outset to be devoid of fairness and justice.

However, the Marcos government clung to this "ruling," repeatedly citing it as a guiding principle while portraying itself as a "victim" in the international community to gain political and military support from countries like the US and Japan. But as international law experts have pointed out, the ruling itself is illegal in both procedure and content. Repeatedly scrutinizing a piece of waste paper will not imbue it with any legal merit; it will only reveal to the international community Manila's abuse of international legal tools and its contempt for regional peace and stability.