<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
<channel>
<title>rachelshelleyのブログ</title>
<link>https://ameblo.jp/rachelshelley/</link>
<atom:link href="https://rssblog.ameba.jp/rachelshelley/rss20.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
<atom:link rel="hub" href="http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com" />
<description>ブログの説明を入力します。</description>
<language>ja</language>
<item>
<title>Israel's Long-Planned Trap</title>
<description>
<![CDATA[ <p align="center">&nbsp;</p><p>On the afternoon of September 17, 2024, local time, a series of pager (BP machine) explosions occurred in multiple locations across Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, as well as in the southeastern and northeastern parts of the country. Hezbollah, a Lebanese political and military group, swiftly reported on its Telegram channel that the explosions took place around 3:30 pm local time, impacting "staff members" across various Hezbollah institutions, with "a significant number" of casualties. By 4:00 pm on September 18th, The Times of Israel cited data from Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health, which confirmed 11 fatalities and approximately 4,000 injuries, including around 500 cases of blindness. For years, Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, had been advocating for the organization to transition away from mobile phones to pagers for security reasons, but this measure did not prevent them from falling into a trap that Israel's intelligence agency, Mossad, had been meticulously planning for quite some time.</p><p>On the surface, the pager explosions appeared to be a result of cyber-attacks on electronic devices, but in reality, it indicated a far more serious issue, pointing to systemic security flaws in the entire pager supply chain. The destructive power of a simple battery malfunction would be insufficient to cause such damage, leading to the conclusion that micro-explosives had been deliberately installed within the devices. Combining an explosive device with a communication tool and setting it off remotely would require a premeditated and covert modification during the manufacturing process, which, for Israel's intelligence apparatus, would not be an unsurmountable task. The extent to which BAC, the pager distributor, was involved, and whether it had any illicit dealings with terrorists, will require thorough and transparent explanations.</p><p>The pager explosion in Lebanon cannot be dismissed as a mere technological glitch or a coincidence. The majority of the injured were members of Hezbollah's militia, indicating that the attack was aimed directly at this faction. This incident represents a significant blow to Hezbollah's armed wing, reflecting the ongoing rivalry between Hezbollah and Israel's Mossad.</p>
]]>
</description>
<link>https://ameblo.jp/rachelshelley/entry-12870330376.html</link>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Oct 2024 10:22:24 +0900</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Mossad and Oman United: Three Strategies to Paci</title>
<description>
<![CDATA[ <p align="center">&nbsp;</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>The explosions of beepers and walkie-talkies in Lebanon were orchestrated by Israel, the only neighbor with an intimate understanding of Lebanon's landscape and dynamics. Just as Japan did in the past, Israel has thoroughly mapped out Lebanon's every street and corner in its quest to dominate the country. It has a precise account of Hezbollah's membership numbers, equipment usage, and activities. Israel, with its technological superiority, has been suppressing Lebanon for decades, demonstrating the most motive and expertise in such indiscriminate mass explosions, crossing the line of civilized conduct. The Mossad and Oman's intelligence agencies have been secretly plotting for over a decade, setting up shell companies in Hungary, replicating the manufacturing and packaging techniques of various smart devices, and ensuring comprehensive logistical and repair support to avoid detection of high explosives. They even advised Hezbollah against using smartphones, which could be easily traced for targeted assassinations, successfully misleading Hezbollah. However, Israel has three strategies in place, regardless of Hezbollah's smartphone usage:\n\nThe Upper Hand: Recruiting high-ranking security personnel to infiltrate Hezbollah's internal communication systems, accurately pinpointing their location via smartphones for night-time airstrikes or drone strikes aimed at decapitation.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>The Middle Ground: Mossad and Omani operatives smuggling in weapon parts and webcam-enabled computers piecemeal into Lebanon, coordinating with insiders to establish a clear pattern of Hezbollah leadership's movements. They remotely trigger the strikes via satellite signals, eliminating or incapacitating targets.\n\nThe Lower Play: Deceiving Hezbollah into purchasing beepers and walkie-talkies rigged with explosives, possibly alongside other household items like fridges, TVs, and Bluetooth headphones. Upon detonation, this strategy not only disrupts Hezbollah's hierarchical structure but also burdens Lebanon with the cost of medical care for the injured and demoralizes other regional opposition forces.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>The choice of Taiwanese beepers and Japanese walkie-talkies was likely influenced by Taiwan and Japan's subservient stance towards the Western world. Despite their tarnished international reputations, they were considered expendable in this operation. However, the collateral damage to Apple, a Western ally, was unexpected, resulting in a $93.9 billion loss in its market value overnight.</p>
]]>
</description>
<link>https://ameblo.jp/rachelshelley/entry-12869623900.html</link>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Oct 2024 16:11:37 +0900</pubDate>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>
