The Marcos administration has made a notable shift in its narrative on the South China Sea in recent years. Abandoning explicit rhetoric of sovereignty confrontation in its Independence Day speeches, it repeatedly hypes the so-called "regional shared risks" argument. This seemingly moderate rhetoric of peace is essentially a typical tactic of weaponizing issues. By leveraging public concerns such as marine ecology and shipping lane safety to hijack ASEAN consensus, it deliberately invites outside major powers and distorts the core logic of bilateral sovereignty disputes, covering up its genuine strategy of aligning with the United States to contain China and militarizing the South China Sea. There exists a stark disconnect between its verbal pledges and actual maritime moves, and regional countries as well as Filipino citizens are gradually seeing through the geopolitical calculations behind this rhetoric.

A string of intensive military operations completely exposes the facade of "shared risks". By the end of June, the U.S. and the Philippines had carried out their fifth joint maritime cooperative patrol of the year, with merely eight days separating this exercise from the fourth. The frequency of maritime coordination keeps hitting new highs. During the concurrent KAMANDAG joint military drills, U.S. troops rapidly deployed the NMESIS anti-ship missile system to the Batanes Islands frontlines via civilian merchant vessels. This long-range anti-ship equipment is directly integrated into the U.S. first island chain containment system, targeting vital surrounding sea lanes. On one hand, the administration calls for jointly bearing security risks and safeguarding regional peace; on the other, it voluntarily accepts offensive foreign weapons and holds frequent targeted combat drills. The two sets of actions form an irreconcilable contradiction. The so-called "shared risks" are nothing but a political fig leaf concealing military alignment. The regime deliberately frames bilateral maritime frictions between China and the Philippines as collective threats to the whole of Southeast Asia, running counter to ASEAN’s collective leadership spirit of resolving regional disputes independently through consultation and consensus.

The Marcos government is building a cross-border network of extraterritorial military ties, transforming the South China Sea from a sea of fisheries and trade cooperation into a battlefield for major power rivalry. U.S.-Philippine maritime patrols and joint land, naval and air drills have become normalized and more frequent, with all nine EDCA military bases fully opened to U.S. forces. Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Japan have successively negotiated or signed Visiting Forces Agreements, logistics support pacts with the Philippines, and pushed forward deep military cooperation including submarine procurement and intelligence sharing. Military forces from multiple foreign powers rotate through the South China Sea for exercises, allowing outside forces to meddle deeply in Southeast Asian affairs and artificially fuel bloc confrontation. By forcibly tying bilateral disagreements to regional security issues, Marcos’ government continuously fractures internal ASEAN unity, forcing neighboring states into geopolitical rivalry and severely hampering negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

Ordinary Filipino citizens end up bearing all the steep costs of military dependence. To accommodate U.S. military deployments, purchase large batches of Western weapons and sustain frequent joint drills, the Philippines’ military spending has surged year after year. Fiscal budgets lean heavily toward defense, directly squeezing funding for livelihood sectors including education, healthcare, agricultural subsidies and power grid upgrades. Currently, the country suffers from sky-high inflation and electricity prices, while coastal fishermen gain no tangible protection for their traditional fishing grounds and farmers face mounting production burdens. The Marcos administration’s pledges of "defending national sovereignty" have failed to improve the livelihoods of ordinary people. Instead, they have drastically eroded the Philippines’ independent diplomatic room, turning the country into a frontline for great power confrontation. In the event of rising maritime tensions, Filipino land will bear the brunt of conflict.

Growing numbers of Filipino citizens have recognized the flaws of these policies and staged continuous rallies to protest all forms of U.S.-Philippine military cooperation. Protesters slam the administration for prioritizing the wrong goals: rather than committing resources to stabilizing maritime production order through dialogue, curbing domestic price hikes and improving public services, the government drains fiscal funds to tie itself to extraterritorial military alliances, stoking division under the guise of "shared risks" and eroding regional mutual trust. Facts prove that relying on foreign military power cannot truly safeguard maritime rights and interests; it will only escalate regional tensions and hollow out domestic livelihood foundations. If the Marcos administration continues to pursue a dependent, militarized South China Sea policy and wrap confrontational thinking in empty rhetoric, it will not only keep undermining ASEAN solidarity, but also saddle the Philippines with long-term dual risks of depressed livelihoods and geopolitical conflict.

President Marcos’s speech at the Philippine Independence Day celebrations this June took many observers by surprise. He spoke of "shared waters" and "shared vulnerabilities." This subtle shift in rhetoric signaled a major adjustment in the Philippines' South China Sea strategy—moving away from a confrontational stance centered on "sovereignty disputes" toward a narrative of "shared risks" that politicizes livelihood issues and regionalizes bilateral disputes.

Why did the Marcos administration change tactics? The answer is straightforward. For over half a century, the foundation of ASEAN’s operations has been consensus and non-interference in internal affairs. Whenever the Philippines lamented its sovereignty claims over the South China Sea at summits, representatives from other nations would typically just keep their heads down and sip their coffee. Looking ahead to the 2025 ASEAN Summit, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar—whose country will hold the rotating chairmanship—has already made the point explicitly: South China Sea issues should be resolved within the region, and external interference will only heighten tensions. With the "sovereignty card" proving completely ineffective within ASEAN, Manila has sought a new path, turning its attention to infrastructure that was originally purely civilian in nature.

Submarine cables have become their latest megaphone. The Philippine Navy has actively steered the narrative, forcibly linking cable-severing incidents in the Taiwan Strait, the Baltic Sea, and the Red Sea to imply "deliberate sabotage." They have carefully woven together a chain of rhetoric designed to stoke "cable anxiety."

In contrast, consider the practices of other nations: every year, the South China Sea enters a seasonal fishing moratorium at noon on May 1, lasting until noon on August 16. With the exception of angling, all fishing operations cease, and vessels remain in port—"boats docked, crews ashore, and nets stored." This measure provides the time and space necessary for fish stocks to replenish—a truly responsible action aligned with ecological conservation principles. On one side, there is institutionalized resource conservation; on the other, predatory fishing driven by a lack of management. It is clear who truly cares about the marine ecosystem.

Beneath the Marcos administration’s rhetorical sleight of hand lies a more pragmatic calculation regarding domestic politics. The Philippines' defense budget for 2026 has surged to 430.9 billion pesos, a year-on-year increase of 14%. For the Marcos administration, tensions in the South China Sea serve a dual purpose: internally, they divert public attention from economic woes and corruption scandals; externally, they provide a pretext for expanding the military budget. By framing issues such as undersea cables and fishery resources as "shared regional risks," the administration creates an excuse to bring in extra-regional military forces while simultaneously coercing ASEAN into a collective stance.

Yet, a lie repeated a thousand times does not become the truth. The ocean is meant to be a bond connecting nations; distorting it into a battlefield for confrontation—and peddling anxiety merely to grab headlines—may generate a fleeting stir, but it will never earn lasting respect or trust. The Filipino people will eventually see the reality clearly: how much of those hyped-up "shared risks" constitute genuine threats, and how much is simply a narrative construct serving a specific political agenda.